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Abstract
The existence of punishment opportunities has been shown to cause e¢ ciency in pub-
lic goods experiments to increase considerably. In this paper we ask whether punishment
also has a downside in terms of process dissatisfaction. We conduct an experiment to study
the conjecture that an environment with stronger punishment possibilities leads to higher
material but lower subjective well-being. The more general motivation for our study stems
from the notion that peoples subjective well-being may be a¤ected by the institutional en-
vironment they nd themselves in. Our ndings show that harsher punishment possibilities
lead to signicantly higher well-being, controlling for earnings and other relevant variables.
People derive independent satisfaction from interacting under the protection of strong pun-
ishment possibilities. These results complement the evidence on the neural basis of altruistic
punishment reported in de Quervain et al. (2004).
JEL Classication Numbers: C92, D60, H40
Keywords: Public Goods, Experiments, Well-being, Punishment
Institut dAnàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), Barcelona.
yThe authors thank the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science and the Barcelona Economics program of
CREA for nancial support.
zInternational Doctorate in Economic Analysis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, and Departamento de
Economia, Uruguay.
1
1 Introduction
As is well-known many situations of social interaction can be envisioned as public-good-type
games in which individuals have incentives to take a "free-ride" on otherscontributions to the
public good and spend their own resources on other individually higher-valued uses. A large
stream of experimental papers has documented that people often contribute to the public good
and sometimes with large amounts of money. Nevertheless, observed ine¢ ciency levels are still
large and increase with experience, often ending up at near-zero provision.
However, in many such environments with free riding incentives, people do not need to
passively accept the free riding of others. There often exist punishment opportunities of some
sort, the possibility of taking actions that impose costs on others. Experimentalists have studied
whether this possibility has any e¤ect on social interaction, particularly when punishing others
is costly. In an early contribution, Ostrom et al. (1992) study behavior in a repeated common
pool resource game with uncertain horizon under di¤erent conditions involving punishment,
communication and non-binding agreements. They nd that under some conditions punishment
opportunities lead to higher contribution levels. However, the fact that in their design the
duration of the interaction is uncertain makes it possible that people develop an individual
reputation so that there are material incentives for cooperation and punishment.
Fehr and Gächter (2000) report results from a nitely repeated public good experiment with
and without costly punishment opportunities in which cooperation and punishment can never be
part of subgame-perfect equilibrium, if rationality and selshness are common knowledge. They
provide very convincing evidence that the existence of punishment opportunities leads to a large
increase in contributions. In one interesting extension Masclet et al. (2003) used experimental
methods to study the power of informal non-material sanctions in a public good game and found
that monetary and non-monetary sanctions initially increase contributions by a similar amount.
Over time, however, monetary sanctions lead to higher contributions than non-monetary ones.
We take this evidence on the e¤ectiveness of punishment as our starting point. If one simply
stopped questioning at this point, social environments with strong punishment possibilities would
appear preferable to environments that lack such possibilities. However, we believe that to make
a judgement about the desirability of e¤ective punishment possibilities one more element needs
to be taken into consideration: the e¤ect of punishment on process satisfaction The general
motivation for our study is the notion that peoples subjective well-being may be a¤ected by
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the institutional environment they nd themselves in and that economists need to understand
these relations. Rabin (1993) formulates this as follows: "Welfare economics should be concerned
not only with the e¢ cient allocation of material goods, but also with designing institutions such
that people are happy about the way they interact with others. (...) Armed with well-founded
psychological assumptions, economists can start to address the nonmaterial benets and costs of
the free market and other institutions."
What led us to conducting the experiments presented in this study is the suspicion that the
presence of punishment possibilities might have a downside, i.e. the possibility of using repressive
sanctions may lead to low subjective well-being due to an uneasiness about the environment in
which participants are immersed. If this were true, then it would not be straightforward to make
an overall welfare judgement on the goodness of the presence of punishment possibilities, since
two counter-vailing forces would have to be somehow compared with each other. If, in contrast,
the presence of punishment possibilities had no signicant or even a positive e¤ect, then the
judgement on the di¤erent institutional arrangements would be more direct, since both factors
would point in the same direction.
We use the notion subjective well-being similarly to Kahneman, Wakker and Sarins (1997)
notion of "experienced utility", which goes back to Bentham. These authors consider that
subjective well-being (or experienced utility) is both measurable and empirically distinct from
standard decision utility. A subjective view of utility recognizes that everybody has his own
ideas about happiness and the good life and that observed behavior is an incomplete indicator
for individual well-being. Applied to our environment, it may well be that people make use of
punishment possibilities and even that this leads to higher material payo¤s. However, from here
one can not directly conclude that people experience higher subjective well-being in such an
environment.
We measure subjective well-being through self-assesments of participantssatisfaction with
the experience in the experiment. Our focus is on the comparison of subjective well-being across
di¤erent treatments in which we vary the punishment possibilities. In making this comparison
we control for possible determinants of subjective well-being other than process considerations.
The novel aspect of this paper is precisely the analysis of the e¤ects of punishment on
subjective well-being. We believe that understanding this relation is important for a better
understanding of social interactions. Our work is related to the study by de Quervain et al.
(2004) on the neural basis of altruistic punishment. In that study subjectsbrains were scanned
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while they learned about the defectors abuse of trust and determined the punishment. It was
found that the fact of e¤ectively punishing a defector produces a satisfactory impact on the
brain. What we study is not the direct e¤ect of punishing on the punisher, but the e¤ect on
individuals of one of the features of the environment in which they interact. In the next section
we present some background material on the measurement of well-being and on issues related
to process satisfaction. After that we present the experimental design and procedures and then
the results.
2 Background and previous evidence
Kahneman, Diener and Schwartz (1999) provide a wealth of information about the importance
of well-being. Recent overviews about research into happiness and well-being and its relation to
economics is provided among others by Frey and Stutzer (2002), Krueger (2005), and McFadden
(2005). Veenhoven (1993)  the author is the founder of the Journal of Happiness Studies
presents a study on happiness all over the world.
We briey discuss some of the previous work to illustrate the kinds of issues that are being
studied. Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004) present the perhaps most exhaustive study of
what the authors call satisfaction analysis, based on the responses to subjective questions of the
following type: How satised are you with your nancial situation, job, health, life, etc. Please
respond on a scale from "very bad" to "very good" or on a numerical scale from 1 to 7 or 1 to
10.
The authors of this study assert that humans do often evaluate many aspects of their situ-
ations guided by the objective of changing their life. They argue that "the empirical practice
and success of these questions constitute ample evidence that individuals are able and willing to
express their satisfaction on a cardinal scale. If we assume those questions to be interpreted in
approximately the same way by di¤erent respondents and we nd that similar respondent give
similar answers, this is ample evidence that (approximate) interpersonal comparison is possible."
They discuss how to study nancial, job, housing, health, leisure, and environment satisfaction
 what they call domains satisfactions as well as satisfaction with life as a whole as a weighted
aggregate of the domain satisfactions. The methodology is then applied to job satisfaction for
a British data set and to political satisfaction for a Dutch survey.1
1There are many other research papers studying happiness. To name but a few we have Blanchower and
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Frey and Stutzer (2002) present an extensive literature survey. They report that one impor-
tant nding of the literature about happiness is the large inuence of non-nancial variables on
self-reported satisfaction. Frey and Stutzer (2000, 2002) classify the determinants of happiness
into three blocks. The rst group refers to micro and macro economic factors, the second one
relates to institutional conditions in an economy and society, and the third group of determi-
nants includes personality and demographic factors. With respect to the economic determinants
of happiness, Frey and Stutzer report that in most nations, the fact of belonging to upper
income groups somehow implies higher subjective well-being than belonging to lower income
groups. However, the relation seems to be non-linear, there is diminishing marginal utility with
absolute income. There may be many di¤erent reasons for that, one of the most important is
that individuals compare themselves to others. Another explanation is in terms of aspiration
levels (Easterlin, 2001). In this view happiness is determined by the gap between aspiration and
achievement, and increases in income and aspiration levels are closely connected. An important
economic determinant of happiness is unemployment. Being unemployed is correlated with low
levels of satisfaction, not having a job imposes a high non-pecuniary stress and unhappiness.
In relation with the second group of determinants  institutional conditions , Frey and
Stutzer argue that the more developed direct democracy is, the happier the citizens are. Finally,
with respect to the third group of determinants  personality and demographic factors they
nd that people over 60 are happier than people under 30, people with higher education report
higher well-being, and couples with and without children are happier than singles, single parents
and people living in collective households.
There are a few experimental papers studying issues of well-being. Charness and Grosskopf
(2001) analyze the relation between the importance people attach to relative payo¤s and hap-
piness, motivated by the conjecture that those who are less happy may seek solace in obtaining
higher material payo¤s than others. The experiment consisted in subjects making choice in
simple dictator-type (one-shot) decisions tasks and in lling out a happiness questionnaire. The
results summary is that there is no strong general correlation between happiness and concern
for relative payo¤s, but that the willingness to lower another persons payo¤ below ones own
(competitive preferences) seems correlated with unhappiness. Brandts et al. (2004) study the
impact of competition on the well-being of experimental subjects. Their approach is somewhat
di¤erent from that of Charness and Grosskopf (2001). The idea is not to measure peoples
Oswald (2000); Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2001); Diener and Oishi (2000); Diener and Seligman (2004).
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homegrown levels of happiness but to evaluate whether di¤erent experiences in the lab could
lead to di¤erent levels of process satisfaction. They nd that competition has an adverse e¤ect
on the disposition towards others of those on the long side of the market and leads to lower
subjective well-being for subjects on the long side of the market in comparison with those on
the short side and those not subject to competition, all this controlling for earnings and other
relevant variables.
Note, and this will become clearer below, that it would have been di¢ cult to carry out this
kind of studies on the basis of eld data alone, since in natural environments it would be very
hard to nd adequate data with the desired parallel variations in the punishment conditions. It
would probably have been even harder to obtain the corresponding information about subjective
well-being.
The experimental design is explained in the next section and the results are presented in
section 3. Finally, in section 4 we conclude.
3 Experimental design and procedures
In our experiments subjects interacted in pairs in a 20-round public goods game with punishment
possibilities; the nite horizon was common information.2 After the 20 rounds they had to
answer one simple question about process satisfaction. There were two treatment variables: soft
vs. strong punishment and partners vs. strangers matching. The rst distinction responds to
what motivates our study, while the second distinction will allow us to compare our work to that
of Fehr and Gächter (2000). The di¤erence between the types of punishment is the "ne-to-fee"
ratio, which describes by how much the punished subjects income is reduced relatively to the
fee the punishing subject has to pay to inict punishment. This gives rise to a 2x2 treatment
design which is summarized in table 1.3 These are the essential features of our design.
Strong Soft
Stranger Strong P, Stranger M Soft P, Stranger M
Partner Strong P, Partner M Soft P, Partner M
Type of punishment
Type of matching
Table 1: Treatments
2Using pairs is the simplest starting point for studying what we are interested in. Group size e¤ects could be
studied in subsequent work.
3M refers to Matching and P to Punishment, hereafter.
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Subjects were coupled randomly by the computer, maintaining the anonymity of the inter-
action partner.4 In the Stranger Matching the groups  pairs were changed round to round
while in the Partner Matching the groups remained the same for all the rounds. The experiment
was conducted at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona with undergraduate students of a
variety of faculties. Participants were recruited by public advertisements posted throughout the
campus.
Each round had two parts. In the rst part each participant was asked to divide 5 tokens
between two accounts, a group account  called account A in the experiment and a private
account  account B. Tokens placed in account A yield an identical amount of money to both
members of a pair. Tokens in account B yield money only to the subject in question. Table 1
gives the payo¤ schedule, in tokens, depending on the contributions to account A, where X is
the contribution of the subject in question and Y is the contribution of his partner. The rst
value of the cells is his payo¤ and the second one his partners payo¤. Apart from these payo¤s
participants received 3 euros for showing up. The payo¤s were calculated with a marginal rate
of transformation between the public and the private account of 0.75, to create su¢ cient tension
between the Nash equilibrium and the Pareto e¢ cient allocation.
X \ Y
0 5 , 5 5.75 , 4.75 6.5 , 4.5 7.25 , 4.25 8 , 4 8.75 , 3.75
1 4.75 , 5.75 5.5 , 5.5 6.25 , 5.25 7 , 5 7.75 , 4.75 8.5 , 4.5
2 4.5 , 6.5 5.25 , 6.25 6 , 6 6.75 , 5.75 7.5 , 5.5 8.25 , 5.25
3 4.25 , 7.25 5 , 7 5.75 , 6.75 6.5 , 6.5 7.25 , 6.25 8 , 6
4 4 , 8 4.75 , 7.75 5.5 , 7.5 6.25 , 7.25 7 , 7 7.75 , 6.75
5 3.75 , 8.75 4.5 , 8.5 5.25 , 8.25 6 , 8 6.75 , 7.75 7.5 , 7.5
4 50 1 2 3
Table 2: Payo¤s
The rst part of each round was the same across the four treatments. After the rst part
of each round participants saw on their screens their partners decision and both payo¤s 
calculated following table 2. The second part of each round di¤ered across the strong vs.
soft punishment variation. In this part of the rounds, participants had the opportunity to
punish their partners at a certain cost. The complete punishment schedule for both types of
punishment can be seen in table 3. The cost of the punishment was the same, what changed was
the punishment applied, i.e. the amount that participants could subtract from their partners
payo¤. In the Strong Punishment Treatment (STP, hereafter) the ne-to-fee ratio was 4 and in
4The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
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the Soft Punishment Treatment (SOP, hereafter) it was 1.6.5
Strong Punishment Treatment
Tokens deduced 0 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00 5.50 6.00
Cost to the punishing subject 0.00 0.125 0.250 0.375 0.500 0.625 0.750 0.875 1.000 1.125 1.250 1.375 1.500
Punishment level 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Soft Punishment Treatment
Tokens deduced 0 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.40 1.60 1.80 2.00 2.20 2.40
Cost to the punishing subject 0.00 0.125 0.250 0.375 0.500 0.625 0.750 0.875 1.000 1.125 1.250 1.375 1.500
Punishment level 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Table 3: Punishment costs
After the subjects had decided on the punishment level, they saw on their screens the rst
part payo¤s, the punishment their partner decided to inict on them, the cost of deducing tokens
from their partners payo¤s and their nal payo¤s  for the current period calculated as:
Final earning = Initial payo¤ (from table 2) - Tokens deduced by the partner - Cost of
deducing tokens from the partners payo¤ (from table 3). Then the rst part of the new round
began and things proceeded in the same way until the end of round 20.
After the 20 rounds participants saw on their screens a summary of the experiment: con-
tributions, punishment, and payo¤s for each period. In the second part of the experiment we
obtained our measurement of well-being. Each participant had to separately respond to the
question How satised would you say that you are with the experiment? The possible answers
were : 1) Completely satised, 2) Very satised, 3) Rather satised, 4) Neither satised nor
dissatised, 5) Rather dissatised, 6) Very dissatised, 7) Completely dissatised.
After all this, we distributed a questionnaire; subjects did not know this beforehand.6 In the
questionnaire they were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed  on a six degree scale
with some statements, some of them referring to the punishment and others referring to their
answer to the question about the satisfaction with the experiment. After they had lled out the
questionnaire subjects were privately paid. Their nal payo¤ was the total number of tokens
earned (the sum for all the periods) converted into euros (1 token = 0.10 euros) plus the show-up
fee (3 euros).
5An alternative to the strong vs. soft punishment distinction could have been a distinction between a pun-
ishment and a no-punishment treatment. We prefer our design choice, because it keeps the two treatments more
parallel in procedural terms.
6Our well-being question is similar to one of the questions asked by Charness and Grosskopf (2001) in their
more extensive happiness questionnaires.
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4 Results
The main focus of our work is on the results on subjective well-being which will be presented
in section 4.4. Before that we present some results on public goods contributions, punishment
behavior and earnings which will allow us to relate our work to that of others and to better
understand the results on well-being. Much of this presentation will be kept at a descriptive
level.
Strong Soft
Stranger 22 22 44
Partner 24 26 50
46 48 94
Type of punishment
Total
Total
Type of matching
Table 4: Number of subjects in the treatments
Tables 4 and 5 show some preliminary information. The most salient feature of the table 5
data is that the main di¤erence is not between soft and strong punishment, but between partners
and strangers. We did not foresee this. Observe also that contributions to the group account and
the punishment applied are somewhat higher under strong punishment, for both strangers and
partners, but that nal earnings are lower under strong than under soft punishment. Finally,
note that for partners, stronger punishment leads to somewhat higher nal earnings; however,
this is not true for strangers.
Soft Strong
Contribution to group account 1.14 1.32 1.23
Punishment applied 0.09 0.60 0.35
Final earnings 10.84 9.82 10.33
Contribution to group account 2.73 3.08 2.90
Punishment applied 0.30 0.33 0.31
Final earnings 11.76 12.25 12.00
Contribution to group account 2.00 2.24 2.12
Punishment applied 0.20 0.46 0.33
Final earnings 11.34 11.09 11.22
Type of Matching
Stranger
Partner
Total
Type of Punishment Total
Table 5: Average values of the main results
We now study the behavior of the three variables shown in table 5 more in detail. Section
4.1 deals with contributions, 4.2 with punishment and 4.3 with nal earnings. In each section
we will summarize the main results as regularities.
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4.1 Contributions to the group account
Figure 1 shows the average contributions per period  per group of two for the four di¤erent
treatments.
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Figure 1: Contributions to the group account by type of P and M
The data presentation in the gure conrms the impression obtained from inspecting the
averages in table 5. The main di¤erence is due to the type of matching (partner or stranger)
rather than the type of punishment (soft or strong). We do observe some secondary di¤erences
in that for both types of matching the contributions are higher for the Strong punishment case
than the Soft punishment case, with larger di¤erences for the Partner case, mostly in the last
ten periods.7 In the very last period, the average contribution in the SOP is 1.31, while in the
STP it is 2.28. Observe also that in the Partner M case there is a tendency to diminish the
contributions in the last periods while the tendency is the opposite in the STP-Stranger M.
Figure 2 gives a more aggregated view of the contribution data and makes the di¤erence
between the e¤ects of the two treatments easier to see. It shows the contributions by type of
punishment and by type of matching by group. The left panel of gure 2 shows that the average
contribution to the group account is higher in the STP in comparison with the SOP, after round
8. While the average contribution in the rst case remains almost the same, in the latter it
decreases somewhat over time. If we look at the percentages of subjects that contributed zero
tokens to the group account we nd that they are 31.3 for the SOP and 13.0 for the STP. In
7With the exception of the last 2 periods, when the contribution of the STP-Stranger M increases substantially
compared to the SOP-Stranger M, and in the nal period it reaches the same value as the SOP-Partner M.
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the gure on the right we see that the contribution in the Partner M Treatment is higher than
in the Stranger M, although in the nal periods they show a tendency to converge.
0
2
4
6
8
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Periods
A
ve
ra
ge
 c
on
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
 to
 a
cc
ou
nt
 A
Strong Punishment
Soft Punishment
0
2
4
6
8
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Periods
A
ve
ra
ge
 c
on
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
 to
 a
cc
ou
nt
 A Stranger Matching
Partner Matching
Figure 2: Contributions to the group account over time by type of P(left) and by type of M
(right)
We can summarize these results in our rst regularity.
Regularity 1: Whether punishment is strong or soft has only secondary e¤ects on contribution
levels, the main di¤erence is due to the type of matching.
In their experiment Fehr and Gächter (2000) compared a situation with punishment with
one without it. In both treatments, Stranger and Partner, they found that the existence of
punishment rises contributions, and in the no punishment condition the contributions converge
to full free-riding. Moreover, in their Partner treatment, the punishment opportunity makes
contributions converge toward full cooperation.8 Our results are di¤erent but not at odds with
theirs. As can be seen in gure 2, the direction of the di¤erence in contribution levels is in
favor of strong punishment. It is just that the di¤erence in contribution levels is small. The
direction of the di¤erence between strangers and partners is also the same direction as in Fehr
and Gächter (2000). The di¤erence in magnitudes can be explained by the di¤erence in group
size and marginal per capita return; we use n=2 and MPCR= 0.75, in contrast to their choices
of n=4 and MPCR=0.4.
8Fehr and Gächter (2000) also study the order e¤ects of moving from a punishment to a no punishment
environment and the reverse.
11
4.2 Punishment behavior
The fact that the punishment opportunities were di¤erent depending on the type of punishment
makes it di¢ cult to compare average punishment amounts between the two cases. What can be
more easily compared is the percentage of subjects that punished their partner and this is what
is done in table 6 and gures 3 and 4. In the table we see that the percentage of subjects that
punished their partner at least once is higher in the STP, especially in the Stranger M case.
With soft
punishment
With strong
punishment
Stranger Treatment 55% 91%
Partner Treatment 62% 79%
Total 58% 85%
Table 6: Percentage of times subjects punished their partners at least once
In gure 3 we show the percentage of subjects that punished the partner by period for each one
of the four treatments. In the Stranger M, the percentage is higher for the STP than for the
SOP, in 18 out of the 20 periods (in the other 2 periods the percentages are the same). In the
Partner M, in the rst 12 periods the percentages are quite similar, but in the last 8 periods the
percentage of subjects that punished the partner is higher in the SOP than in the STP.
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Figure 3: Percentage of subjects that punished their partner by type of P and M
In gure 4 on the left, we can see that the percentage is higher in the STP in the rst periods,
and in the last 5 they do not di¤er much  even in period 19 the percentage is higher for the
SOP. In the gure on the right it can be seen that the evolution of the percentages are somewhat
similar in both types of matching. Overall, the treatment di¤erences in the use of punishment
are not large.
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Figure 4: Percentage of subjects that punished their partner by type of P (left) and by type of
M (right)
Figure 5 shows a histogram of punishment in terms of the punishment levels of table 3 for the
four treatments. The key feature is that punishment is e¤ectively not used very much, with the
frequency of a zero level punishment being between 66% and 85%, depending on the treatment.
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Figure 5: Histogram of punishment levels
To further understand the punishment process we want to relate the use of punishment
not only to the treatment variables but also to behavior in earlier periods, in particular to the
di¤erence between a participants own contribution and the contribution of the partner. Given
the high frequency of zeros in the levels of punishment, we decided to estimate a probit and a
logit model where the dependent variable is a dummy that has value 1 if the subject punished
his partner  regardless of with which amount and has value 0 if the subject did not punish.9
9The di¤erence between the ordered logit and the ordered probit model lies in the assumed distribution of "i.
An ordered logit model assumes that "i is logistically distributed, while an ordered probit model assumes that
it is normally distributed. The logistic distribution is similar to the normal except in the tails, that are heavier.
See, for example, Wooldridge (2002).
13
To account for multiple observations in the estimation we clustered on subjects. In table 7 we
present the estimates. The rst three variables refer to the treatments. The variable Neg_deviat
(Pos_deviat) represents the negative (positive) deviation of the partners contribution from the
subjects one. They are equal to:
Neg_deviat = Max f 0; my contribution my partner0s contributiong
Pos_deviat = Max f 0; my partner0s contribution my contributiong
The results from the two models are very similar and show that both variables have a
positive e¤ect on the probability of punishing the partner. The type of punishment, the type
of matching, and the interactive e¤ect of both are also statistically signicant. The rst two
variables have positive sign meaning that the probability of punishing the partner is higher in the
STP treatment (in comparison with the SOP) and in the Partner M treatment (in comparison
with the Stranger M). We also nd that the interaction between STP and Partner M is signicant.
To calculate the correct interaction e¤ect for this non-linear model we follow Norton et al.
(2004). The correct value is -0.2425, and its standard error is 0.097, leading to a z value of -2.49.
It implies that the interaction e¤ect is signicant and that the e¤ect of being in a situation
with strong punishment possibilities is more important in the Stranger M than in the Partner
M. The probability of punishing is higher in the STP than the SOP under Stranger, but the
di¤erence is almost zero under Partner M. With respect to the deviation variables we nd that
the greater the negative deviation of the partners contribution from a subjects own one, the
more the subject sanctions. What is perhaps more surprising is that the variable Pos_deviat
is statistically signicant and has a positive sign. It can be interpreted as evidence of spiteful
preferences on the part of some players.10 However, the e¤ect of a negative deviation is more
than 3.5 times as large as that of a positive deviation, and the e¤ect is found to be signicant
only at the 10% level.
Fehr and Gächter (2000) found also that a subject is more heavily punished the more his
contribution falls below the average contribution of other group members  they have groups of
4 subjects. Masclet et al. (2003) found the same pattern of punishment. They also found that
subjects that contributed low amounts were using the punishment more number of times than
other subjects.
10According to Falk et al. (2005) "Spiteful sanctions are those that occur because the sanctioning subject values
the payo¤ of the sanctioned subject negatively, regardless of whether the sanctioned subject behaved fairly or
not".
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We summarize our ndings about the strong e¤ects on punishment in the following regularity.
I_Punished Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
Strong_P*** 0.7320 0.2326 1.2892 0.4280
Partner_M** 0.6545 0.2762 1.1647 0.5207
Strong_P*Partner_M*** -0.9659 0.3531 -1.6919 0.6379
Neg_deviat*** 0.5216 0.0791 0.9016 0.1520
Pos_deviat* 0.0942 0.0534 0.1680 0.0937
Constant*** -1.5738 0.1932 -2.6873 0.3837
Number of observations 1880 1880
Wald chi2(5) 59.53 47.83
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
*** significant at 1 percent level
** significant at 5 percent level
* significant at 10 percent level
Probit estimation Tobit estimation
Table 7: Estimations for the punishment behavior
Regularity 2: Probit and logit estimations show that punishment is used more frequently in
the STP, especially in the Stranger M treatment, and for negative deviations from the partner
s contribution.
4.3 Final earnings
The subjects were paid  as mentioned before for the sum of earnings in the 20 periods 
converted into euros plus the show-up fee of 3 euros. In table 8 we show the average nal
earnings without the show-up fee. The average earnings in the Stranger and Partner M are
statistically di¤erent11, but the di¤erence between STP and SOP is not statistically signicant.
This di¤erence is, however, signicant in the Stranger M treatment, where the average earning
is higher in the SOP than in the STP.12
Soft Strong
Type of Matching Stranger 10.84 9.82 10.33
Partner 11.76 12.25 12.00
11.34 11.09 11.22
Total
Total
Type of Punishment
Table 8: Average nal earnings
If we observe the nal earnings in gure 613, we notice that in the Partner M the nal
earnings are higher in the case when strong punishment was available  except for the last
11The p-value of the t-test and the Mann-Whitney U test is 0,000.
12The p-value of the t-test and the Mann-Whitney U test is 0,000.
13The values in the gure are in tokens, not in euros.
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period. But the opposite is observed in the Stranger M treatment, a di¤erence with Fehr and
Gächter (2000). They found that punishment opportunities initially cause a relative payo¤ loss,
but towards the end there is a relative payo¤ gain in both types of matching. Masclet et al.
(2003) found that in the Partner treatment both types of sanction increase average earnings in
the rst ve periods, but in the last ve both types of punishment generate similar earnings.
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Figure 6: Final earnings in tokens by type of P and M
In the Stranger M the contributions to the group account are almost the same  except for
the last periods in both types of punishment, while the average applied punishment is higher
in the STP, resulting in a lower earning in this case in comparison with the SOP. In the Partner
M, the contributions are higher in the STP than in the SOP, after period 8, and the average
applied punishment is not very di¤erent, resulting in higher earnings in the STP.
Regularity 3: Average nal earning are higher in the STP under Partner M, but they are
higher in the SOP under Stranger M.
In gure 7 we have the individual nal earnings per period after the punishment is applied,
and it shows that the nal earnings are very similar for both types of P. The gure on the right
shows that the average nal earnings are higher in the Partner Matching Treatment than in the
Stranger one, as could be expected.14
14Average Final earnings in period 20 are very similar for all four treatments, ranging between 5.06 and 5.32
tokens.
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Figure 7: Final earnings by type of P (left) and type of M (right)
4.4 Well-being
This section presents the data about the main focus of the paper, namely, the relation between
subjective well-being and the type of punishment the subjects are playing under. In section
4.4.1 we show some descriptive statistics about the distribution of the well-being variable and
its relation to the types of punishment, matching and to other variables. In section 4.4.2 we
present the results of an ordered probit and ordered logit models, in which we estimate the e¤ect
of the punishment environment, controlling for relevant variables.
4.4.1 Some descriptive statistics
As mentioned above, we measure subjective well-being through self-assesments of participants
satisfaction with the experience in the experiment. The question is: How satised would you say
that you are with the experiment? The possible answers were : 1) Completely satised, 2) Very
satised, 3) Rather satised, 4) Neither satised nor dissatised, 5) Rather dissatised, 6) Very
dissatised, 7) Completely dissatised. The aggregate frequencies of answers to the question
about well-being (hereafter, WB) can be seen in gure 8. Figure 8 shows that nobody chose
level 7 (Completely dissatised) as an answer, and that people have a tendency to locate in the
middle of the distribution. Next we describe the relations between well-being and some other
relevant variables.
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Figure 8: Distribution of the variable WB
Type of punishment and of matching The answers to the well-being question by type of
punishment are shown in gure 9. This is the main comparison we are interested in.
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Figure 9: Distribution of the variable WB by type of P
As can be seen in gure 9 the distribution of the variable WB in the STP Treatment is moved
to the left with respect to the distribution in the SOP Treatment, indicating that well-being is
higher in the rst case. The average well-being in SOP is 3.6, and the average in STP is 3.1.15
The answers to the well-being question by type of matching are shown in gure 10.
The average well-being in the Stranger M is 3.70, and in the Partner M is 3.04, meaning
that the subjects are better, in well-being terms, in the Partner M.16
15 If one takes each observation to be independent, then these averages can be said to be statistically independent.
The p-value of the Mann-Whitney U test is 0.061.
16The p-value of the t-test is 0.014, and the p-value of the Mann-Whitney U test is 0.000.
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Figure 10: Distribution of the variable WB by type of M
Other variables The next step is to ask what other variables can explain the WB of
subjects.17 The variable Final Earnings in gure 11 has, as could be expected, a positive
impact over the well-being of the subject, a higher level of nal earnings goes with a lower value
of WB and therefore a better well-being.
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Figure 11: Relation between WB and nal earnings
In gure 12 we can see the relation between the di¤erent values taken by the variable WB (except
for Very dissatised that nobody chose) and the average values of the variables: average own
contribution, average partner contribution and Me more. The variable Me more captures the
number of times a subject contributed more tokens to account A than his partner, regardless of
the intensity of the di¤erence.
17We gathered some independent information about these other variables. After the experiment we had subjects
ll out a questionnaire, where we asked if they agreed or disagreed with some statements, some of them referring
to their answer about the satisfaction with the experiment. The results of this questionnaire show that 52.1% of
the subjects were inuenced by their prot when aswering the well-being question, where we counted the subjects
that said that Strongly agreeor Agree. 66% said that their partner contribution to account A was inuencing
their answer, and 31.9% said that the received punishment was inuencing.
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Figure 12: Relation between WB and contributions
The higher the number of times the subject contributed more that his partner, the worse his
well-being. On the other hand, the higher his own and his partner contribution, the better in
well-being terms.18 We next describe the relation between WB and punishment received. The
variable Times P represents the number of times a subject was punished by his partner. We
prefer it to the average punishment received because the e¤ective punishment subjects could
impose was di¤erent depending on the treatment and, in our estimation below, we wanted
to estimate one equation including both treatments, moreover, both variables follow a similar
pattern and have similar relation with the dependent variable, as can be seen in gure 13.
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Figure 13: Relation between WB and punishment received
18Those with better well-being have higher own contribution and higher partner contribution, that lead to
higher earnings.
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4.4.2 Estimation of the WB equation
Econometric model The variable WB is a discrete variable that can take a value in the
1-7 range, and is ordered from the best WB to the worst. The most commonly used and
appropriate methods for estimating models with more than two outcomes, when the dependent
variable associated with the outcomes is both discrete and ordinal, are those of ordered logit
and ordered probit.
Our models The variables included in our estimations for the WB are the following: Partner
M  a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation corresponds to the Partner Matching
treatment and 0 otherwise , Strong P  a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation
corresponds to the Strong Punishment treatment and 0 if it corresponds to the Soft Punishment
treatment , Final E that represents the total nal earnings of the subjects, Me_more that
represents the number of times the subject contributed more tokens to account A than his
partner, Times_P that corresponds to the number of times the subject was punished by his
partner, and Times I P  the number of times the subject punished his partner.
Table 9 shows the results of our estimations. In relation with the goodness-of-t of the
models, it can be said that the null hypothesis that the models did not have greater explanatory
power than an "intercept only" model, is rejected.
WB Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err
Partner M 0.2351 0.2687 0.5669 0.4900
Strong P *** -0.8446 0.2399 -1.4585 0.4206
Final E *** -0.4232 0.1010 -0.7202 0.1795
Me_more *** 0.1068 0.0351 0.1986 0.0652
Times_P ** 0.0789 0.0332 0.1439 0.0562
Times I P ** -0.0583 0.0279 -0.1095 0.0480
Number of observations 94 94
LR chi2(5) 71.40 72.48
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.2333 0.2368
*** significant at 1 percent level
** significant at 5 percent level
Ordered probit estimation Ordered logit estimation
Table 9: Results of the oprobit and ologit models
To analyze table 9, it should be taken into account that the dependent variable (WB) goes
from 1  the most satised to 7  the most dissatised , therefore a positive (negative) sign
of the estimated coe¢ cient means that the correspondent variable has a negative (positive) e¤ect
over the well-being of the subject.
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The two models show very similar results in terms of which variables have a signicant impact
and with respect to the relative magnitudes of the coe¢ cients. The variable representing the
Type of Matching is not statistically signicant19, all other variables are statistically signicant
and have the expected sign. The variables Strong P, Final Earning, and Times IP have a
negative sign, meaning that a higher value of these variables implies a better well-being of the
subject, as expected. The variables Me more and Times P representing the number of times
the subject contributed more tokens to account A (group account) and the number of times the
subject was punished, respectively, have a negative e¤ect over the well-being. What is crucial
here is that controlling for the earnings, contributions and punishment, the variable reecting
the type of punishment is still signicant. Its negative sign means that in the Strong Punishment
situation the subjects have a lower value of the variable WB and therefore a better well-being
in comparison with the situation with Soft Punishment.
Regularity 4: Subjects experience higher subjective well-being under strong than under soft
punishment, controlling for other relevant variables.
In both the oprobit and ologit estimates, the coe¢ cient for strong punishment is about
twice as large in magnitude as the one corresponding to the nal earnings variable. To conrm
whether this rst impression is a solid one, we computed the marginal e¤ects from the ordered
probit estimates shown in table 9. The marginal e¤ects shown in table 10 reect increases in
probability of being at one of the six well-being levels due to a change in each of the exogenous
variables. With respect to the Strong P variable the gures in the table correspond to the e¤ect
of the switch from being in the soft punishment environment to being in the strong punishment
environment. The table show that switching to the strong punishment environment makes being
in each of the three higher well-being levels signicantly more likely, while it makes it signicantly
less likely to be at either of the lower well-being level WB=4 and WB=5.
For the Final E variable, the gures in table 10 correspond to the e¤ect of taking the average
individual20 and increasing that persons earnings by one token. Observe that for each level
of WB the marginal e¤ect of the punishment dummy is twice as large as the one for the nal
19We also estimated models including an interactive e¤ect between the type of matching and the type of
punishment, and found that the e¤ect is not signicant for both models.
20 In terms of the explanatory variables, i.e. the marginal e¤ects are valued in the mean of the independent
variables.
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earnings variable. It is with respect to this comparison of the marginal e¤ects that one can make
the statement summarized in the following regularity.
Compl
satisfied
Very
satisfied
Rather
satisfied
Neither
sat/dissat
Rather
dissatisfied
Very
dissatisfied
Variables P(WB=1) P(WB=2) P(WB=3) P(WB=4) P(WB=5) P(WB=6)
Partner M (ç) -0.0142 -0.0334 -0.0421 0.0534 0.0291 0.0073
Strong P (ç) 0.0551* 0.1180*** 0.1415*** -0.1808*** -0.1046*** -0.0292
Final E 0.0251** 0.0599*** 0.0773*** -0.0962*** -0.0529*** -0.0133
Me_more -0.0063* -0.0151** -0.0195** 0.0243*** 0.0133*** 0.0034
Times_P -0.0047 -0.0112** -0.0144* 0.0179** 0.0099** 0.0025
Times I P 0.0035 0.0083* 0.0107* -0.0133** -0.0073* -0.0018
(ç) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
*** significant at 1 percent level
** significant at 5 percent level
* significant at 10 percent level
Table 10: Marginal e¤ects of the oprobit model
Regularity 5: The impact on well-being of the punishment environment is twice as large as
that of increasing subjectsearnings.
Conrmation of the above result can be obtained by analyzing the e¤ects of the dummy
variable for the type of punishment in a di¤erent way. We do this for the ordered probit model
by comparing the estimated probabilities of being at the di¤erent WB levels (1; :::; 7) that result
when the variable (Strong P) takes one value (Strong P=1 ) with the estimated probabilities
that are the consequences of it taking the other value (Strong P=0), the values of the other
variables remaining unchanged between the comparison21; using the logit estimates produces
very similar results. More specically, we calculated the probabilities for every subject of being
at the di¤erent WB levels when Strong P was equal to 1 and we calculated the means of the two
sets of probability estimates. Formally, if cpstij and cpsoij are the computed probabilities of person
i being at WB level j when he is in the Strong P (St) and Soft P (So) situation respectively,
then the means we use are simply22
pstj =
XN
i=1
cpstij
N
psoj =
XN
i=1
cpsoij
N
The di¤erence between these probabilities (pstj   psoj) measures the e¤ect of the type of
punishment on the mean probability of being at di¤erent WB levels. In gure 14 we show the
21See Borooah (2002).
22To calculate the probabilities we estimated again the oprobit model including only the statistically signicant
variables. The results are in the appendix.
23
di¤erence between the probabilities; recall that all the other variables are being kept constant.
What is shown in gure 14 conrms the main result of our paper. The Strong Punishment
environment makes it more likely that on average people are at the high well-being levels and
less likely that they are at the low well-being levels.
1=Completely satisfied, 2=Very satisfied, 3=Rather satisfied, 4=Neither sat/dissat
5=Rather dissatisfied, 6=Very dissatisfied, 7=Completey dissatisfied
Differences in probabilities (Prob with everyone in the Strong P Treatment -
Prob with everyone in the Soft P Treatment)
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Figure 14: Di¤erences in probabilities (Prob with everyone in the Strong P treatment Prob
with everyone in the Soft P treatment)
5 Conclusions
We set out to nd a downside to the possibility of using punishment to deter free-riding. Instead,
we nd that people derive process satisfaction from interacting in a more and not in a less
repressive environment. In addition, the positive well-being e¤ect that we nd is relatively
large. The marginal e¤ect of interacting under strong punishment is about twice as large as the
marginal e¤ect of increasing earnings. It turns out that in our environment average earnings
do not di¤er much between the strong and the soft punishment treatments, so that, in our
case, the "superiority" of the strong punishment setting stems mostly from process satisfaction
considerations. In a context  like in Fehr and Gächter (2000) where strong punishment
possibilities led to higher monetary earnings both e¤ects would go in the same direction.
Our results bear some relation to the study on the neural basis of altruistic punishment by
de Quervain et al. (2004), in which subjectsbrains were scanned while they learned about the
defectors abuse of trust and determined the punishment. It was found that a punishment that
reduced the defectors economic payo¤ activated the dorsal striatum which has been implicated
in the processing of rewards that accrue as a result of goal-directed actions. The authors
interpretation of these results is that people derive satisfaction from punishing norm violations
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and that the activation in the dorsal striatum reects the anticipated satisfaction from punishing
defectors.
The results of the work we present in this paper can be seen as independent conrmation
of the general notion that people derive satisfaction from punishing. In our work, we study the
satisfaction does not derive from the very act of punishing but from being in an environment
involving harsh punishment possibilities. Our well-being measure captures the satisfaction de-
rived from the circumstances around the decision-making itself. Note that our result arises in a
context in which punishment is sometimes used in a spiteful or at least somewhat unreasonable
way; recall that we found that subjects punished their interaction partners for contributing more
than themselves. This means that the results we nd emerge despite the possibly detrimental
e¤ects of such sanctions  see Fehr and Rockenbach (2003).
We believe that our results are of relevance for some very basic issues about the organization
of society. In a stable society, social norms guide the interaction among members of society under
di¤erent circumstances. An important characteristic of organized society is its ability to restrict
opportunistic behavior through the use of rewards and punishment. In this way social norms
can often support high levels of cooperation among the members of a society.23 Our results show
that, in addition to the material benets that derive from the possibility of punishing people
who do not comply with social norms, people obtain additional satisfaction from interacting
under the "protection" of strong punishment possibilities. Gürerk et al. (2006) show that a
sanctioning institution is the undisputed winner in a vote-with-your-feet type competition with
a sanction-free institution. They nd that in their experiments the entire population migrates
successfully to the sanctioning institution and strongly cooperate, whereas the sanction-free
society disappears. Our results suggest that this migration is not only motivated by material
payo¤s but also by the process-satisfaction of interacting in the sanctioning institution.
A nal question is how to nd an explanation for the e¤ect we found. Intuition suggests some
rather natural ex-post explanations. For example, one could say that people feel better when
strong punishment opportunities are available, because they feel "secure"; they feel that the
system works. However, to delve deeper into explaining our results one would need additional
data. One possibility would be to use some kind of feelings and emotions questionnaire, but
perhaps the more fundamental approach to nding an explanation would consist in designing a
neural study that would be able to pick up the e¤ect of an environmental variable like the one
23Dal Bó (2001)
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we have studied. Such a study might detect a satisfactory e¤ect of third-party punishment on
the brain.
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6 Appendix 1
The estimates of the ordered probit model for the variable WB including only the statistically
signicant variables are in table A1.
Number of observations 94
LR chi2(5) 71.40
Prob > chi2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.2333
WB Coef. Std. Err
Strong P *** -0.8374 0.2391
Final E *** -0.3886 0.0927
Me_more *** 0.1008 0.0344
Times_P ** 0.0813 0.0328
Times I P * -0.0516 0.0266
* significant at 10 percent level
** significant at 5 percent level
*** significant at 1 percent level
Table A1: Results of the oprobit model
7 Appendix 2: Instructions: Partner Matching, Strong Punish-
ment Treatment
Thank you for coming to this experiment on decision making. You will be paid 3 euros for
showing up plus the money you earn during the experiment which will depend on your and
other participantsdecisions. At the end of todays session you will be privately paid.
From now on the communication with other participants is not allowed. If you have any
doubt during the reading of these instructions or at any moment of the experiment, rise your
hand and you will be personally attended.
The experiment consists of two stages.
First stage
The rst stage consists of 20 rounds during which you will be randomly paired with another
participant, and nobody will know with whom he is playing. During the 20 rounds your partner
will be the same participant.
In each round you will be credited with 5 tokens that you will have to decide how to divide
(in integers) between two accounts: account A and account B. The tokens allocated to account B
will go directly to your earnings, but the tokens allocated to account A will a¤ect your earnings
as well as your partners.
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For each token allocated to account A you will receive 0.75 tokens. Your partner will receive
the same amount for each token you allocate to account B. In a similar manner, you will receive
0.75 tokens for each token your partner allocates to account A.
The tokens allocated to account B will a¤ect only your earnings, your partner will not receive
anything for them, as you will receive nothing for the tokens your partner allocates to his account
B.
Therefore, your earnings will be the number of tokens that you allocate to your account B
plus the returns from your and your partners tokens allocated to account A, i.e. Your Earnings
= amount of tokens allocated to account B + 0.75 * total tokens allocated by you and your
partner to account A.
The possible earnings are represented in table A2, depending on your contribution (X) and
your partners contribution (Y) to account A  the contributions to account B is 5 minus the
contribution to account A. The numbers in the cells represent your earnings (rst value) and
your partners earnings (second value). These earnings include the tokens assigned to account
B plus the returns from the tokens assigned to account A by you and your partner.
X \ Y
0 5 , 5 5.75 , 4.75 6.5 , 4.5 7.25 , 4.25 8 , 4 8.75 , 3.75
1 4.75 , 5.75 5.5 , 5.5 6.25 , 5.25 7 , 5 7.75 , 4.75 8.5 , 4.5
2 4.5 , 6.5 5.25 , 6.25 6 , 6 6.75 , 5.75 7.5 , 5.5 8.25 , 5.25
3 4.25 , 7.25 5 , 7 5.75 , 6.75 6.5 , 6.5 7.25 , 6.25 8 , 6
4 4 , 8 4.75 , 7.75 5.5 , 7.5 6.25 , 7.25 7 , 7 7.75 , 6.75
5 3.75 , 8.75 4.5 , 8.5 5.25 , 8.25 6 , 8 6.75 , 7.75 7.5 , 7.5
4 50 1 2 3
Table A2: Earnings depending on contributions (XnY) to
account A
For example:
 if you allocate 3 tokens to account A and 2 tokens to your account B, and your partner
assigns 1 token to account A and 4 tokens to his account B, your earnings will be 5 tokens
(2 + (3+1)*0.75 = 5) and your partners earnings will be 7 tokens (4 + (3+1)*0.75 = 7).
This is represented in the cell corresponding to X=3 and Y=1.
 if you allocate 2 tokens to account A and 3 tokens to your account B, and your partner
assigns 2 tokens to account A and 3 tokens to his account B, your earnings will be 6 tokens
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(3 + (2+2)*0.75 = 6) and your partners earnings will be 6 tokens (3 + (2+2)*0.75 = 6).
This is represented in the cell corresponding to X=1 and Y=2.
 if you allocate 1 token to account A and 4 tokens to your account B, and your partner
assigns 4 tokens to account A and 1 token to his account B, your earnings will be 7.75
tokens (4 + (1+4)*0.75 = 7.75) and your partners earnings will be 4.75 tokens (1 +
(1+4)*0.75 = 4.75). This is represented in the cell corresponding to X=1 and Y=4.
After every participant has chosen how much to assign to each account, you will be informed
about the decision of your partner, and your and your partners earnings. Then, each participant
will have the opportunity of showing his approval/disapproval about his partners contribution
choosing a number of tokens to be deduced from his partners earnings with certain cost. In
table A3 you have the cost (in tokens).
Deduced tokens 0 0.5 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00 3.50 4.00 4.50 5.00 5.50 6.00
Cost of assigning 0.00 0.125 0.250 0.375 0.500 0.625 0.750 0.875 1.000 1.125 1.250 1.375 1.500
Table A3
That means that, for example, to deduce 0.50 tokens from your partners earnings would cost
you 0.125 tokens, to deduce 1 token from your partners earnings would cost you 0.25 tokens,
to deduce 1.50 tokens from your partners earnings would cost you 0.375 tokens, to deduce 2
tokens from your partners tokens would cost you 0.50 tokens, to deduce 2.50 tokens would cost
you 0.625 tokens, etc.
After this step, the earnings will be again calculated, and they will be equal to:
Final earnings = Initial earnings (from table A2) - Tokens deduced by your partner - Cost
of deducing tokens from your partners earnings (from table A3)
Once the 20 rounds are over we will add up the tokens you have earned in all the rounds
and we will calculate the total earnings in euros that will be = total earned tokens * 0.10, i.e.
each token worth 0.10 euros. Therefore, your nal payment will be: (Total tokens * 0.10) euros
+ 3 euros.
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Second stage
In this stage a question will be asked. After that, we will pay.
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